Although all care is taken to ensure integrity and the quality of this publication and the information herein, no responsibility is assumed by the publishers, the author nor Wageningen University for any damage to the property or persons as a result of operation or use of this publication and/or the information contained herein.
Introduction
This report is a background document for Nikol and Jansen (2018) and provides a comprehensive overview of the developments and events of the Philippine struggle for regulation on aerial spraying of pesticides between 1997-2016. The information provided is relevant to outline and analyse the civil society lobby as it contested the practice of aerial pesticide spraying on large banana plantations on the island of Mindanao. It helps examine the following: 1) how the civil society lobby engaged in a politics of expertise, 2) how civil society level evolved over time and in response to particular events, 3) how counter-expertise developed, 4) which organisations develop it, 5) the specific lobby activities it is used for, 6) the level of government at which the struggle took place, 7) which government representatives and offices were addressed, 8) how and with whom civil society organisations collaborated, 9) which government representatives are allies, and 10) how pro-aerial spraying stakeholders (i.e. banana growers/ banana companies, government representative and offices) responded to lobby efforts. This report lists passed laws, proposed laws, lobby activities, state-civil society interactions, research conducted and published, and a series of lawsuits that represent the response of banana growers and companies. It also includes preliminary analytical observations and comments of the authors, to guide the reader on significance, influence, and sequences of events or to provide contextual information.
The events and activities in the civil society lobby included in this list are relevant for the analysis of the politics of counter-expertise in the struggles for regulations of aerial spraying presented in Nikol and Jansen (2018) . This research contributes to the recent literature on the role of social movements in the transformation of pesticide risk regulation (Bohme 2014; Harrison 2011; Barraza et al. 2013; Jansen and Dubois 2014; Arancibia 2016; Lapegna 2016; Perkins 2012; Zwetsloot et al. 2018) . The article describes how the struggles started in the early 2000s in Davao City, Mindanao, with the filing of a proposed regional ordinance to ban aerial spraying. As the ban was passed and banana growers filed a lawsuit for unconstitutionality (that was taken through several courts up to the Supreme Court), the civil society lobby against aerial spraying shifted from the regional government in Davao City to national government in Manila. In its lobby, civil society organisations like MAAS and IDIS developed counter-expertise, such as health studies, drift studies, economic studies, and narrations of residents experiences (ethnographic expertise), to challenge existing assumptions of who has legitimate or acceptable knowledge about pesticide risks.
Methodology
For this research, we collected and analysed 165 documents (government documents such as House Bills, media items such as newspaper articles, press releases, blog posts, and internet sites, and unpublished reports), complemented with literature on the Philippine state, and telephone interviews and email communications with MAAS and IDIS. The internet was a rich source, as Philippine organisations and government have a comprehensive online presence on their own websites, in media such as newspapers and blogs, and social media like Facebook. Documents were downloaded from government databases, newspaper websites, and civil society organisation's websites, or HTML sites converted into PDFs (mostly newspaper articles, blog posts, and social media posts). A handful of government documents was obtained via request to the Philippine House of Representatives. The snowball technique proved very useful to guide our search, as documents refer to events, persons, organisations, or other documents that are relevant.
Most of the table below is based on an existing time line of events prepared by IDIS (2014), but has been modified: some entries have been left out, most rewritten, and entries have been added, especially but not exclusively post-2014 (when IDIS' original table ended). To the best of our abilities, we have added references to official government documents, media, web-, and other sources that verify the events, shed light on their role or significance, or point to how they are framed by the civil society lobby. However, plenty of entries are based on IDIS staff's experience and engagement with government actors and could therefore not be verified with external sources. The table is structured as a timeline of events and includes a separate column for codes to indicate which sequence particular events belong to, matching to some extent the chapters of Nikol and Jansen (2018) The codes have been devised to match the structure and argumentation of Nikol and Jansen (2018) . The first three codes (EO, AO, RL) parallel the three main sub-sections outlining the specifically targeted efforts of the civil society lobby addressing different sections and levels of the government. In Nikol and Jansen (2018) , we argue for a central role of counter-expertise 1 in the civil society lobby, which consists not only of studies developing systematising expertise "often the purview of scientists" ) who use and rely on their professional knowledge and experience to conduct these studies. Other types of counter expertise include collecting and framing ethnographic expertise in the form of residents' narrated experiences and organisational expertise referring to "networking with allies and linking and translating the anti-1 In the article we argue that conceptualising counter expertise "is only possible when no strict boundaries are drawn between scientific and non-scientific expertise: counter-expertise is not limited to the work of scientists." It "encompasses multiple kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing, including [but not limited to] the use of science to reveal facts such as higher disease incidence due to pesticide spraying and people's experience of suffering. As Arancibia (2016, 480) points out, 'in public scientific controversy, the conflict is not between scientists, on the one hand, and a 'pure lay community', on the other. Controversy is between mixed groupings that include both experts and lay people.' Counter-expertise also connects with the concept of collective action by social movements. It has to be developed, mobilised and supported by other political actions, including both lobbying/advocacy and building alliances, in order to become effective." (Nikol and Jansen 2018, emphasis added) aerial spraying goals to the goals of like-minded organisations" and "dealing with different levels of government and the capacity to maintain an organisation's funding and to keep it running" . It should be noted that in this timeline counter-expertise is not just developed or used where the code is applied, but it is oftentimes part of other events and strategies (e.g. lobby visits to executive departments and awareness raising through briefing letters and press releases). The code for lawsuits and litigations helps keep track of the multiple lawsuits filed by the Philippine banana company LADECO against Dr Quijano, his daughter, the newspaper they published their report in, and the research team of the Department of Health (DOH); i.e. all actors involved in developing counter-expertise based on the experiences of the residents of Kamukhaan, a village located close to one of LADECO's plantations. What follows is an overview of House Bills that are part of a series and which died and were re-filed in different administrations. The House Bills within a series usually carry the identical title, contents has often been revised a little, and they are usually filed by the same (group of) representative(s) or party-list(s). Two series of House Bills that aim to suspend aerial spraying, share very strong similarities. The five House Bills providing new regulation in the form of application requirements for aerial spraying, though from two different series, are almost identical.
Overview of House Bills filed
Apart from the similarities within the series of House Bills, it has to be observed to what extent they reflect a heterogeneity and lack of transparency over mandates within the The general struggles and events cover four administrations, to be known Estrada (1998 Estrada ( -2002 , Arroyo (2002 Arroyo ( -2004 2004 -2010 3 , Aquino III (2010 ), and Duterte (2016 . Comment: The arrest happened long after the initial criminal charges had been dismissed (PL-01). It is unclear how renewed criminal charges could have been filed against Dr. Quijano at the DOJ, as they had already been dismissed in 2000. Wallar (2004) finds it important to mention that at the time, Lorenzo Jr was both CEO of LADECO and Secretary of the DA (2002) (2003) (2004) for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as she took over Presidency from the ousted Estrada. According to Wallar (2004) , in his function Lorenzo was also responsible for pesticide policy and urged by Senator Pimentel to take the issues raised by Dr Quijano's report, and confirmed in Nisperos, seriously. heavy fungus infestation and/or no export banana production; aerial spraying was already prohibited through the plantations environmental compliance certificates), the bans had a more symbolic value; 2. The PBGEA targeted the Davao City Ordinance because it affected a major export banana production area and the outcome of litigation could have been used to undermine other ordinances later on.
August 2008 The Court of Appeals declares that Davao City Ordinance 0309-07 is unconstitutional. The Davao City Council and MAAS elevate the case to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Court of Appeals grants a preliminary injunction, allowing banana producers to continue aerial spraying of pesticides (Bersamin 2016; IDIS 2014; Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 22, 2015; Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 22, 2016 (Dionisio et al. 2009 ).
22 July 2009 EO-04 Another IACEH meeting to discuss the aerial spray ban. The DOH presents a draft health policy on pesticides outlining short, medium, and long term actions to protect public health. The aerial spray ban is included as one of the short-term actions within this draft policy. The aerial spraying issue is then given to the IACEH subcommittee on Toxic Substances and Hazardous Wastes, which has 15 days to give a final recommendation for appropriate action (IDIS 2014).
Comment: The subcommittee was headed by the DENR (IDIS 2014). On the occasions of these meetings, IDIS (2014) mentions the presence of certain governmental departments. However, the documentation does not specify who or which representative was present, i.e. a high ranking official or a staff member. EO-06 The FPA publish the "Good Agricultural Practices on Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations" (GAP) (FPA 2009; IDIS 2014) Comment: Much can be said about the timing of publishing the GAP. They were published in a series of interesting developments on aerial spraying: 6 months after the Senate Bill to ban aerial spraying had been filed (AO-04), the legality of the Davao City Ordinance was pending at the Supreme Court (RL-06), and developments at the executive level (IACEH) that gave the impression that the DOH and DENR would side with the anti-aerial spraying campaign (EO-04; EO-05; EO-13 06). The publishing of the GAP significantly influenced how these series of events developed in the short and longer terms. They turned out to be much to the benefit of the PBGEA.
August 2009
EO-07 DENR Sec. Atienza issues a memorandum temporarily suspending aerial spraying in areas close to residential communities, adding that where this is not possible, adequate buffer zones are to be provided to prevent drifting of pesticides. The memo is not implemented by DENR field offices nor followed by plantation companies (IDIS 2014).
Comment: We have been unable to retrieve the memorandum mentioned here, or other official government documents or press releases confirming its existence and the quoted passage. IDIS (2014) and Inside Mindanao (August 22, 2009 6 ) mention it both, quoting the same passage. We did uncover a memorandum issued by the DENR Secretary Atienza in November that year, urging the strict implementation of the 50m buffer zone, not however suspending aerial spraying altogether (DENR 2009; Balita, November 13, 2009 7 ).
The fact that it followed so soon after a meeting between the DENR, MAAS, and NTFAAS (EO-03) invites the hypothesis that the temporary ban was the direct result of the meeting.
EO-08 MAAS and NTFAAS meet with DOH Secretary Duque. Affected communities narrate their experiences and urge the department to adopt the recommendations of the Kamukhaan study to protect public health. A week later (24.08), the DOH Executive Committee adopts the recommendations of the Kamukhaan study including the aerial spray ban (IDIS 2014).
Comment: It was one of MAAS' main lobby strategies to have affected residents themselves narrate their experiences with aerial spraying to the politicians they were trying to convince of their cause.
September 2009
EO-09 MAAS-NTFAAS meet with DA Secretary Arthur Yap to discuss the effects of aerial spraying (on health, environment, and livelihoods of local communities) and to lobby for a ban. They report Secretary Yap will follow the recommendation of the DOH on the issue of aerial spraying (IDIS 2014). Comment: This was a welcome development for the anti-aerial spraying lobby. The DOH addressed the DA because the FPA was part of that department 9 .
November 2009
EO-13 MAAS farmers, two bishops, and support groups hold a dialogue with Arroyo's Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. During the meeting, the DA and the DENR both agree that aerial spraying is a public health issue and they would follow the recommendations of the DOH. They likewise agree on a recommendation to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to issue an executive instrument banning aerial spraying in the country. Two days later (11.11) Secretary Duque signs a memorandum to President Arroyo recommending an executive order banning aerial spraying (IDIS 2014).
Comment: This is one way for passing regulation in the Philippines: an executive department makes a recommendation to the President to sign an executive order regulating an issue. It is still up to the President whether or not to follow the recommendation, and in this case there was no report of an executive order being issued or any other follow up by President Arroyo on the matter. Considering the developments, especially the publication of the GAP by the FPA a few months earlier, this was considered a very important event for the anti-aerial spraying campaign of MAAS and IDIS.
December 2009
EO-14 MAAS farmers prepare to protest at the DA. They are approached by FPA Director Gicana who says he was ordered (by DA Secretary Yap) to prepare an administrative order banning aerial spraying to be signed the following week (IDIS 2014). Comment: IDIS approach to Secretary Aclala probably timed to sway their position at this meeting.
March 2011 DENR-EMB provides IDIS a copy of the results of the inter-agency meeting.
PCSD is tasked to consolidate all government positions and actions related to aerial spray (IDIS 2014).
Comment: While a change in duty is nowhere explicitly stated or explained, it seems that the PCSD took over the consolidation of governmental agencies positions from the PMS-SRO. It communicated this change in duty to MAAS in May that year (IDIS 2014).
CE-08 San Gregorio (2011) publishes a "Financial Assessment of Shifting from Aerial to Ground Spray in Davao Region."
Comment: The study is commissioned and funded by IDIS.
April 2011 EO-27 PMS-SPO sets a meeting with NTFAAS to discuss the ban aerial spraying campaign (IDIS 2014).
EO-28 PCSD conducts the second inter-agency meeting on aerial spraying (IDIS 2014).
4 July 2011 EO-29 PCSD conducts an inter -agency workshop to assess the gaps and policy recommendations on the existing guidelines on aerial spray. The workshop recommendations include; 1. Update and strengthen guidelines on aerial spraying as part of the agricultural practices in the banana plantations in the country; 2. Formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the guidelines on Aerial spraying; 3. Strengthen the monitoring system under the current Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system; and 4. Design and adopt a monitoring system for farmers and farmer groups which are not being monitored.
(IDIS 2014).
Comment: MAAS was not invited, thus no civil society representatives were present during the workshop (IDIS 2014). The first point referred to the FPA's rules on Goof Agricultural Practices, and indicates that the different agencies identified certain shortcomings and limitations thereof. The second point was crucial, as it indicates a reason for the ineffectiveness of the FPA-GAP: all forms of legislation in the Philippines are accompanied by Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that specify by who, when, and where the stipulations of legal provisions will be carried out. The absence of IRR for the FPA GAP thus meant that there was no specification for their implementation. The third point referred to a form of monitoring that plantations had to organise to comply with the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), which they must acquire for agricultural operations and handling toxic substances. The monitoring system consisted of teams of representatives of the plantation and surrounding communities who, on a regular basis, observed and reported whether the ECC holder complied with its stipulations. The fourth point indicated that the executive departments were aware of the fact that in particular areas and communities, aerial spraying practices were not monitored. Comment: The existing timeline prepared by IDIS (2014) seldom specified what the response to or outcome of these kind of letters, sent by civil society organisations to various executive departments, was. It nonetheless illustrates the awareness-raising lobby strategies of the anti-aerial spraying campaign.
AO-10 MAAS also approaches the Supreme Court Justices by letter, calling for the resolution of the case that questions the constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance Banning Aerial Spray (IDIS 2014). Comment: This is a very good example of heterogeneity within the state: different executive departments and bureaus had different perspective on the same topic. The BPI is part of the DA. Comment: Apart from the first point, we could not retrieve further information on the other two events; whether they took place and if there was any development or follow-up afterwards. According to IDIS (personal communication), the guidelines that the PCSD was supposed to develop based on consolidated positions of the DOH, DENR, and DA were never finalised due to a lack of consensus among the executive departments. and IDIS that what she has learned from the two organizations during the meeting about the aerial spraying issue will still be considered in the study and she will tell Dr. Digal to contact MAAS and IDIS before finalising the project report (IDIS 2014).
Comment: MAAS and IDIS had originally pushed for a drift study, which the PCSD and NEDA also had originally agreed to, but which was replaced by a socio-economic profiling study due to lack of funding (personal communication IDIS The ordinance makes no substantial distinctions when it prohibits aerial spraying, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of chemicals to be applied. The high court also notes that the ordinance imposed a 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural landholdings regardless of size. It states that the city "must not act arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically regardless of the ordinance's salutary purpose." (Bersamin 2016) The high court further specifies that the ordinance also violates due process rights of banana growers. It says they are deprived of efficient means to combat plant diseases, noting that three months are not enough to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying. Lastly, the Supreme Court states the Davao City government has no authority to regulate and control the use of pesticides and agricultural chemicals, because this is lodged with the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA). The high court labels the ordinance an ultra vires act d(issued beyond legal authority), because it prohibits an activity already regulated through FPA regulations under Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2009 (Bersamin 2016; Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 22, 2016; Manila Bulletin, August 12, 2016 13 ).
Comment: MAAS announce they would file for a notion of reconsideration (Davao Today, August 26, 2016 14 ). We have been unable to obtain information whether the Supreme Court has responded to/ ruled on the motion. 
Opportunities for further research
Based on this timeline and our analysis and conclusions in Nikol and Jansen (2018) we identify several opportunities for further research on the Philippine civil society struggles for aerial spray regulations. These include:
-Long-term systematic observations of health and environmental effects of aerial spraying of pesticides in communities close to (export) banana plantations (as opposed to the inventory-like studies conducted thus far). -Drift studies conducted under non-optimal, real conditions, i.e. during 'real practices' of banana growers, to properly assess the actually occurring drift.
-Conduct large scale surveys in several communities for a comprehensive study of ethnographic expertise on real practices and effects of aerial spraying.
-Investigate how aerial spraying as a policy issue should be, and is, institutionally governed in the Philippines. This includes an institutional analysis of the policy domain, outlining the mandates, tasks, and responsibilities of the different departments, as well as an investigation of the people having filled positions in those departments in the period 2008 -2016 to outline how personalistic politics has shaped risk governance of aerial spraying in the Philippine institutional context. 
